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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ESTHER 0. KELLOGG, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
YS. 
CALIFORNIA WESTERN STATES 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CASE NO. 
7159 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal in a proceeding by Esther 0. Kel-
logg, widow of X eal.J. Kellogg, deceased, tried before the 
Court without a jury, for the purpose of recovering the 
double indemnity benefits under the defendant's $2000.00 
insurance policy issued at Salt Lake City, U~tah by the 
respondent, number 520903. It is her position that 
the death was effected by ''accidental means'' within 
the terms of the policy :and as such phrase has been 
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interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Respondent insurance company admits the existence 
of the policy, that it was in full force and effect and 
that all necessary premiums have been duly paid for the 
additional benefits in the event of accidental death. 
However, they have arbitrarily refused to pay to the 
widow the stipulated benefits due to her by reason of 
Mr. Kellogg's accidental death. 
Mr. Kellogg, the insured, in Oetober of 1946, under-
went an unhurried surgical operation at Missoula, Mon-
tana for the reduction and repair of a post-operative 
ventral hernia, which developed from a 1944 operation. 
This was not an emergency operation. Dr. W. N. 
McPhail, the operating surgeon with twenty years of 
experience, testified as to the careful preliminary prepa-
rations and examinations as follows: 
(P. 5 of deposition). "He was completely 
examined to ascertain if hif' physical conditioH 
was safe for an ope~ation of that nature, which 
you could anticipate was going 1o be a long, 
tedious operation, and he was found to he phy:--
ically fit for such an undertaking. This ex-
amination was Yery completP, including- blood 
tests, x-rays, metabolism test. I stated, I believe, 
that he was found in fit condition for that opera-
tion. Then I operated on him October 12th.'' 
Dr. McPhail described the incision made and the 
course of the operation after referring to the adhesions 
found arising from the earlier operation and the timP 
required to complete the surgical repair, 11:00 A.:M. 
to 5:00 P.M. (p. 6 and 7 of deposition). Then he 
testified: 
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· • Q. \\'as this operation performed by you in 
the customary manner for this type of sur-
gieal repair work 1 
~-\. It was. 
Q. \Vas it completed without mishap~ 
~-\. Yes. 
Q. \Vas there anything that intervened from the 
time of the first cutting of the incision to 
the completion of the last sewing of the 
opening, that was unusual or out of the or-
dinary w·ay o? 
~-\. ~ o. X othing beyond the unusually difficult 
adhesions to seper.a te. There was nothing 
in the man's general condition such as signs 
of shock, or anything of that nature. 
Q. \Vhat was his immediate condition following 
the operation~ 
~-\. His condition was good immediately follow-
ing the operation.'' 
His testimony was that Mr. Kellogg left the operat-
Ing room at 5:00 P.:M. October 12th at which time his 
condition "-was good" but that the next day he developed 
Rhock and notwithstanding the application of customary 
treatments he expired at 1 :05 P.M. on October 13th from 
post-operative surgical shock. He testified on this phase: 
(p. 9 of deposition) 
'' Q. "T ould you say tha't this post-operative sur-
gical shock was the can~e of his death? 
A. Yes, I would say so. 
Q. Tell me whether or not this type of death is 
the expected and natural consequence of the 
operation that you performed? 
..:-\. You may get surgical shock from any sur-
gical operation. I~t doesn't of necessity have 
to be even a large or a long operation. We 
feel th'at we rna~- he unlueky enough to get 
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surgical shock any time we operate. But W<' 
ordinarily do not expect to gHt surgical shock 
following an operation. The more extensive 
the operation is, and the greater length of 
time that it takes, of course the more like-
lihood of shock there is. I did not PTZJPct to 
get su.rgical shock when I operated on the 
man, of cou.rse, but we allcays keep it in 
mind. We may get it. It is not an ordinary 
or necessary consequence of such an opera-
tion.'' 
Exhibit "B ", the death certificate made out by 
Dr. McPhail prior to any thought of litigation, shows 
the immediate cause of death as ''Post-operative surgi-
cal shock". It states ~the contributing causes as being 
due to post-operative hernia repair which in turn was 
due to a prior perforated duondenal ulcer. 
Dr. Clark Young was ~ailed as a witness for the 
plaintiff and in part he testified after a review of thP. 
facts in a prior hypothetical question : 
(Tr. 34) 
"Q. Doctor, based upon knowledge of thoRP 
facts just stated, do you have an opinion aR 
to whether or not you ·would expect the 
development of fatal post-operative shock 
following such surgical repair? 
~fR. NEBEKER: The same obj·ection. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
A. No, I would not think that the surgeon would 
expect a fatal post-operative result. Of 
course, that does occur occasionally, but he 
certainly would not expect it normally. 
Q. Assume further those facts just stated abm·p 
and the additional factR that aftpr making 
the incision in the paHent 's abdomen, it was 
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found that tltirtt•t>u to ~PventPPll adlwsio11s 
existed and that the bowel was knuckled but 
not totallv obstrneted, do you have an 
opinion a~ to wether or n~t fatal post-
operative shoek would n·aturally and prob-
ably result or be expected from the surgical 
repair of such conditions'? 
. .:-\. X o, I would not think so. 
Q. 1 ou mean you do not think you have an 
opinion"? 
~\. X o: I would not think that the surgeon would 
expect, operating on such a case, that there 
would be a fatal surgical\ shock. 
Q. X O\Y, assume the facts st:ated above and that 
an operation was performed in the customary 
manner to repair said hernia by a surgeon 
of the experience related, and completed in 
six hours time. without mishap and with-
out any signs of shock developing and •that 
the patient's condition was good immediately 
following the operation, do you have an opin-
ion as to the likelihood of the patient's re-
covery without fatal pos·t-operative ~surgical 
shock'? \Vhat is your opinion on it1 
JlR. XEBEKER: The same objection. 
THE COURT: Overruled. I think there you 
should indicate the time to the doctor. 
Q. (By .J1 r. Pugsley) What would be your opin-
ion, immediately following the operation, 
upon examination, finding that the post-
operative condition was good, as Dr. Mc"'" 
Phail, expressed it~ 
.\. You are bringing in the element of time 
there, are yon not'? 
Q. 'That is right. 
A. I should ~av that the fact that man had been 
on the orw~ating table for six hours would 
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greatly make the liability of shock more of 
a certainty. I would not say a certaint:·, 
but it would certainly suggest the fact that 
he might have a surgical shock. Six hours 
is very unusual time to be on the operating 
table." 
Dr. Young further described the nature of fatal 
post-operative shock, (p. 37-38). "Post-operative shock 
usually results from severe trauma on the sympathetic 
nervous system of the body, also loss of blood, loss of 
bodily fluids in the way of perspiration.'' 
Both doctors, experienced surgeons, testified that 
the operation had been extended by reason of the adhe-
sions found after the incision had been made, which ad-
hesions resulted from the earlier operation for repair 
of a duondenal ulcer and incidental r,emoval of appendix 
at an earlier time. That former operation had been 
completed some 13 months previously with apparently 
normal results in August of 1944. Dr. McPhail testified 
concerning this : 
Q. Will you describe the physical condition of 
_Mr. Kellogg, as you found it in October of 
1945~ 
A. When I examined him in October, 1945, I 
found him ~to have what is knO\vn as a post-
operative ventral hernia. 
Q. You say this was a post-operative hernia. 
From what operation had this hernia de-
veloped~ 
A. When I operated on him the previous admis-
sion, I opera,ted for a perforated duodenal 
ulcer, commonly spoken of as ulcer of the 
stomach. 
Q. That operation was a successful operation, 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in 1944, or was it'! 
_-\. Y l'S, it was successful. l-Ie made the ordinary 
recoYery and left the hospital in good shape. 
Q. This hernia had developed subsequent to the 
time of the opera,tion and his discharge from 
the hospital1 
A. That's right." 
The standard insuring language of the policy reads 
as to the double indemnity provisions: 
··Double Indemnity In Event of Death By Acci-
dental l\Ieans.'' 
The standard insuring language of the policy 
reads as to the double indemnity provisions: 
··Double Indemnity in Event of Death By Acci-
dental :J[eans." 
"Benefits-Upon receipt of due proof on 
forms prescribed by the Company that the death 
of the insured occured while the policy and this 
benefit are in full force and effect, and before the 
anniYersary date on which this policy becomes 
fully paid-up, according to its terms, or prior to 
the anniYersary date of the policy on which the 
age of the insured, at nearest birthday, is sixty 
~,ears. which ever event shall first occur, as the 
result of drowning or bodily injury, either of 
which is effected exclusively and wholly by ex-
ternal, violent and accidental means, of which 
there is a visable contusion or wound on the body 
(other than in the case of drowning or of internal 
injuries, revealed by an autopsy), and that such 
death occurred within ninety days after sustain-
ing such injury, the Company, subject to the limi-
tations hereinafter set forth, will pay double 
the face amount of the policy, or Four Thousand 
Dollars, instead of ~the face amount of the policy." 
"Risks Not Covered-This benefit shall not 
lw payable if the death of the insured results, 
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directly or indirectly, from: self-destruction, or 
any attempt thereat, whether sane or in~ane: 
from the taking of poision or the inhaling of gas 
of any kind, whether voluntary, involuntary or 
otherwise, from committing an assult or fplon:,: 
from a state of war or insurrection; from riding 
in, or from being in or upon, a submarine vessel, 
or any kind of aircraH except as a fare-paying 
passenger while riding inside a licensed pas-
senger aircraft provided by an incorporated pas-
senger carrier while operated by a licensed pilot 
over a regular passenger route between r~tab­
lished airports located within the borders of the 
continental United States of America, excluding 
Alaska; from physical or mental infirmity; from 
illness or disease of any kind; or from any bac-
terial infection other than that occuring in con-
sequence of visible injury on the exterior of 
the body effected solely through external, violent 
and accidental means.'' 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues which have been raised are: 
I. Did the insured die from accidental means . 
resulting from bodily injury ... effected exclusively and 
wholly by external, violent and accidental means, of 
which there is a visible contusion or wound on the body, 
so as to entitle the widow to recover~ 
II. Was insured's death the result of "physical 
or mental infirmity"-; or from "illness or disease of 
any kind"; within the exclusion provisions of the policy~ 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
That the trial court erred in not finding that the 
insured 'f' death resulted from accidental means within 
the insuring clause of the poliry. 
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T'hat the trial court erred in finding that the in-
Slued's death resulted from • 'physical infirmity or ill-
ness or disease". 
ARGUMENT 
The instant case is one wherein the trial court 
had before it only the testimony of Dr. McPhail and 
Dr. Clark Young on behalf of the plaintiff, widow of 
the insured, ·and no conflicting evidence adduced by the 
defendant insurance company. Thus a complete review 
of the evidence, findings and law by your Honorable 
Court is proper. 
On behalf of the widow it is strongly asserted that 
the law has already been reviewed and decided in favor 
of the widow's contention by the case of Maud C. Hand-
ley z:. The Jlutual Life Insurance Company of New York, 
147 Pac. (2d) 319, 106 Utah 184. Therein the widow 
\\·as likewise suing for the double indemnity benefits pro-
vided for in thP life insurance policy on her deceased 
husband. 
The deaths and the policies involved in these two 
cases are parallel. Mr. Handley was 53 years of age 
and :\Ir. Kellogg 46 years old. Each underwent a surgi-
cal operation for reduction of a hernia, and as a result 
thereof ~fr. Handley died from a pulmonary embolism 
while l\[r. Kellogg died from post-operative shock. The 
Handley policy, under which you awarded recovery of 
double indemnity benefits to the widow, provided in part 
for payment of the benefits upon proof of death "as a 
1 lirect result of , bodily injury effected solely through 
external. violent, and accidental means, independently 
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and exclusively of all other causes, and of which . . . 
there is evidence by a visible contusion or wound on the 
exterior of the body ... ". 
The Kellogg policy on which our present action is 
predicated and which was prepared and issued by the 
defendant insurance company provides for similar bene-
fHs upon proof of death ''as a result of drowning or of 
bodily injury, either of which is effected exclusively and 
wholly by external, violent and accidental means, of 
which there is a visible contusion or wound on the body.'' 
In the above cited Handley case you made a very 
careful and thorough analysis of the law in similar cases. 
You noted a divergence in adjudicated cases and after 
reviewing these, you held tha't the death from the hernia 
operation induced embolism was an ''accidental death'' 
and properly awarded to the widow the double indemnity 
benefits provided for therein. 
The parallel of these two cases is such that we 
believe 'and respectfully urge that the judgment of your 
Court should be for payment to Mrs. l{ellogg of the 
accidental benefits provided by this policy. Let ns 
obRerve a few of the further similarities. 
As noted above, each policy employs the standard 
insurance phraseology, through ''external, violent and 
accidental'' means, and each requires the presenee of 
a "visible contusion or wound on the body." 
In the Handley case the hernia operation was per-
formed using ''standard operative procedure'' and there 
were no slips or mishaps. The same evidence applies 
to our case - Mr. Kellogg according to Dr. McPhail's 
10 
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tP~timony was operah'd upon in the customary manner 
for the surgical reduction of the hernia involved. 
The court, through Justice \Y olfe, in the Handley 
case analyzed carefully the material facts and compared 
the decisions. He reasoned that there may be some ques-
tion as to the ··accident'' being determined by the results 
but eited cases heretofore decided by our Supreme 
Court sneh as, Richards vs. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 
3S Utah G~~. 200 Pac. 1017 where death by a sunstroke 
was held to be accidental; and Whatcott vs. Continental 
Cas1wlty Co., 85 Utah 406, 39 Pac. (2d) 733 where death 
from an intended novocane injection used as anaesthetic 
in an appendix operation was held to be an accidental 
death. The court further said: 
'• This court has definitely gone on record as 
eonstruing ,the provision under discussion and 
equivalent provisions as reaching cases where the 
death or disablement is the unexpected result, 
intewle(l acts making the result itself, rather than 
the means, the accident. '' 
There exists in different state courts rules to ~the 
contrary, but Utah has irrevocably gone on record that 
an in~nrance company is bound to pay the accidental 
death benefits in this type of case where the result of 
the intended act (the initial incision of the operation) 
is unexpected. The IIandley decision is replete with 
expressions as to what is an accident within ~the terms 
of these policies, such as, ''an effect which the actor did 
11ot intend to produce", etc. 
'' \Ye have largely rested the decision of this 
case on our own \Vatcott case and that line of 
ea~<>s 'Yhich hold as it did. Independently of that 
11 
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case there is, as has been heretofore intimated, 
substantial authority for the proposition that 
whether the means are accidental is determined 
by the character of their effects. ''Accidental 
means are those which prodtt.ce effects which are 
not their natural and probable consequences. The 
natural consequence of means used is that con-
sequence which ordinarily follows from its use, 
the result which may be reasonably anticipated 
from its use - and which ought to be expected. 
The probable consequence of the use of a given 
means is the consequence which is more likely to 
follo''T from its use than it is to fail to follow." 
(Italics part of quotation.) 
In the Handley case ·the emboli were definitely re-
lated to the operation by the Doctors. Their causes 
lay in the realm of conjecture, bruises of the vein, dif-
ferences in coagulation of the blood, manipulations in 
the operation, or other causes. The operation is desig-
na~ted as the "violent and external injury" within the 
· terms of the policy. 
The Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York 
defended its claimed exemption fr-om liability on the 
basis that the "accident" involved was the one causing 
the hernia and that had occurred more than 90 days 
prior to death and hence was excluded. Your Court 
clearly rejected that theory and then the insurance 
company jumped to a new defense, conceding the surgi-
cal operation supplied the elements of a violent and 
external means, but contended tha't it was not an accident 
because the deceased freely and voluntarily consented 
to it and it was performed as designed and intended and 
''the doctor knew that the re~mlt which did oreur might 
12 
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oecnr without intervention of any fortuitous event. Pul-
monary Elinbolism is a Yery common cause of death". 
On this defensP your decision was that such consHtutes 
an accident within the terms of the policy. 
X o citations are needed to establish that policies of 
this nature and particularly the exclusions and excep-
tions on whieh the insurance company is attempting to 
rest, are to be construed most strongly against the in-
surance company and tha>t the strict understanding of 
the expert legal mind is not the standard for construction 
of policies in suits by innocent beneficiaries against the 
insnranee con1pany who drafted the phraseology of the 
poliey. 
Apparently the insurance company wants ~to deprive 
:Jirs. Kellogg of the benefits of the policy upon some 
theory that there were other factors contributing to 
:Jfr. Kellogg's death, adhesions and partial bowel ob-
~tructions arising from an operation completed over 
thirteen months prior thereto. That this is not a valid 
defen:;:e is realized by comparing the Handley case. In 
that one the hernia had developed more than 90 days 
before death and it was this hernia that was being re-
paired. But the court tied its decision into the first 
cutting of ::\Ir. Handley, as part of the operation, as the 
starting point for determining the accident. Whether 
the unreduced hernia of Mr. Handley for an extended 
period, or the surgeon's unavoidable handling of the 
organs caused the fatal embolism, could not be deter-
mined, and was not found to be material. The fatal 
result fixed the accident. 
13 
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Both men had physical infirmities that made advis-
able surgical reduction. Both men were apparently in 
good condition before the operation. Both were in good 
condition after the operation. Mr. Handley died from 
a fatal embolism developing after the operation; ~Ir. 
Kellogg died from fa,tal surgical shock developing after 
the operation. 
We submit that under the Handley case it is imma-
terial that the operation 'took some six hours, because of 
conditions which appeared or developed subsequent to 
the cutting of the incision, or that after the incision was 
made it may have appeared that Mr. Kellogg was not a 
good surgical risk. The testimony is undisputed that 
at the time of the cutting of the incision (which was 
the "violent external force") Mr. Kellogg was in good 
condition and was considered to be a good surgical risk, 
and neither fatal surgical shock nor death from any 
means was contemplated or expected, but on the contrary 
the development of fatal surgical shock from which he 
died, was an unexpected, unforseen event. 
Recognizing the conflict in authorities in various 
jurisdictions but that Utah has once and for all settled 
the position to be taken by our courts, "~e feel that no 
other cases need bet cited. A review of ~the Handley case 
and the Whatcott case, supra. convinces that the decision 
in the matter now before the court should he in favor of 
Mrs. Kellogg and against the insurance company. 
Since the Handley case, your court decided the 
Tucker v. New York Life Insurance Company case, 155 
Pac. (2d) 173, 107 Ut. 488. ThP California \Vestern 
14 
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~tate~ Life InsurancP Cmnpany, defendant and respond-
ent herein, contended below that said case was con-
trolling· ns relieving the insurance company from liability. 
In this Tucker case the deceas,ed fell and broke his arm 
on N oven1ber 19th, 1941 and died from a ruptured dis-
~eeting aneurysm of the aorta on December 7, 1941. 
Your Court reviewed the evidence and reversed an award 
to the beneficiaries. 
In reviewing the evidence you found that the dece-
dent had been suffering from a diseased heart which 
progressively deteriorated for a year and finally gave 
way by reason of increased blood pressure. You re-
viewed the rules laid down in the Browning v. Equitable 
Life Assu-rance Society, 72:Pac. (2d) 1060, 1073, 94 Utah 
532, case which reaffirmed the rule of strictissimi juris in 
the construction of insurance policies and declared in 
favor of the insured to accomplish the purpose for which 
it was taken and for which the premiums were paid. 
These three rules were stated as : 
(1) "\Yhen an accident causes a diseased 
condition which, together with the accident, re-
~ults in the injury or death complained of, the 
accident alone is to be considered as the cause of 
the injury or d~ath.'' 
(2) "vVhen, at the time of the accident, the 
insured vYas suffering from some disease, but 
the disease had no casual connection with the in-
jtu~' o.r death resulting from the accident, the 
accident is to be considered the sole cause." 
(3) "vVhen at the time of the accident, there 
'trns an existing disease which, cooperating with 
the accident resulted in the injury or death, 
tlw accident cannot be considered as the sole 
cansP, or as the cause independent of all other 
causes." 
15 
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The insurance company would have you believe 
that Mr. Kellogg was suffering from "an existing di-
sease'' which caused the death. The trial court in 
finding No. 10. declared: 
"That the death of said Neal J. Kellogg 
resu!ted directly or indirectly from physical in-
firmity or illness or disease, to-wit: The rup-
tured ulcer of the stomach caused and made 
necessary the surgery in 1944 upon the body of 
the said Neal J. Kellogg, and said surgery caused 
and made necessary the surgery of 1945, which 
in turn caused the death of the said Neal J. 
Kellogg.'' 
Plaintiff took exceptions to said findings of fact 
(p. 18) and represents to this Court that the trial court 
erred in making said finding. This case is clearly not 
analagous to the Tucker case (supra) wherein the di-
seased condition of the heart caused i1t to give way to 
high blood pressure which had been developing for 
over one year. The Tucker case distinguished its facts 
from the decision rendered in 1938 by your Court in 
Lee v. New York Life Insurance Co. 82 Pac. (2d) 178, 
95 Ut. 445. 
In the Lee case it is to be remembered that again a 
widow sought to recover double indemnity benefits under 
a life insurance policy having substantially the same 
language as in the instant case. (It is to be noted that 
all of the double indemnity clauses in the adjudicated 
cases have remarkably similar wording.) 
Mr. Lee on July 12th suffered an accidental blow 
to his abdomen; that ruptured an already diseased gall 
bladder~ which jn turn eaused an infected appendix, 
16 
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which nu1de necessary an operation a month after the 
aecident where the gall bladder and appendix were re-
moved. He failed to rally from the operation and died 
on August 24th. The attending physician testified that 
the infected gall bladder, though of long standing, had 
become dormant and was made active by the blow which 
ruptured it. 
Let us now review again the facts in the instant 
case before the Court. ~Ir. ICellogg had an emergency 
operation for a perforated ulcer in 1944. The operation 
was completed and normal recovery had. Subsequently, 
on the site of the first operation, a ventral hernia devel-
oped causing a bulging of the area and discomfort to 
~Ir. ICellogg. It was to repair this that he went to Dr. 
~[cPhail and the operation was planned. After a careful 
examination, X-rays, metabolism and blood tests, Dr. 
:JicPhail determined that Mr. Kellogg was "found to 
be physically fit for such an undertaking". He was 
taken to the hospital and the operation started. After 
the initial incisions had been made the surgeon dis-
covered that a number of adhesions had developed in 
the area involved, some of which almost obstructed the 
bowel, but did not completely obstruct it. The presence 
of the adhesions extended the time of the operation. 
After the operation he left the operating room and his 
condition was found to be good. Subsequently shock 
developed and progressed to a fatal stage the following 
day. 
The surgeon, Dr. McPhail, testifi.ed that the death 
was unexpected and was ''not an ordinary or necessary 
17 
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consequence of such an operation.'' No disease was 
present. The perforated ulcer had been repaired and 
was no longer active within Mr. Kellogg and there was 
no recurrence of the perforation. (p. 31 of deposition). 
Likewise though partial obstructions of the bowel did 
exist, no toxemia was in evidence. (p. 36 of deposition). 
Though we feel that your Court has by the Handley 
case set out a guide warranting recovery by the widow 
of Mr. Kellogg, permit us to call to your attention an 
analagous case just decided last year by the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. New York Life Insurance Co. 
v. Cooper, 158 Fed. (2d) 257. 
The action again was for the double indemnity 
benefHs of a life insurance policy. The insured was 
suffering from a kidney stone infection and called the 
doctor on September 27 at 2 :00 A.M. At 4:00 A.M. four 
1;.4 grain injections of morphine sulfate (the approved 
and customary treatment) were administered at 30 min-
ute intervals. He suffered intensely and by 10:00 A.M. 
he was in shock. At 2:00 P.M. the pulmotor was called 
and artificial respiration administered. On September 
29th he was admitted to the hospital with pneumonia 
symptons from which he subsequently died, suffering 
a respiratory collapse. 
Recovery of double indemnity benefits were awarded 
to the beneficiary because the respiratory collapse of the 
insured was the unexpected, unusual and unforeseen re-
sult of the morphine injections. (p. 258) "Death then, 
was the unexpected result of intended means.'' 
See similarly, Rinaldi v. Pntde11tial Insurance Co., 
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11S Conn. 419; 172 A. 777. Insured suffered from 
chronic myocarditis and angina pectoris. He was struck 
in the head by a stick while sawing· and then died from 
heart difficulties. p. 780, approves the rule stated in 
the case of F-reeman v. Merchantile Mutual Accident 
A8s'n., 156 1\fass. 351, 353; 30 N.E. 1013, 1014; 17 L.R.A. 
753. 
• ·An injury which naturally produce death in 
a person of a certain temperament or s~tate of 
health is the cause of his death if he dies by 
reason of it, even if he would not have died if his 
temperan1ent or previous health had been dif-
ferent: this is so as well when the injury inter-
rupts the vi tal processes.'' 
(Cites a large number of cases from var-
ious courts.) 
":Jlanifestly. recovery is not barred merely 
hecause the insured is suffering from disease." 
(Cites more cases.) 
Thus on behalf of the widow of Neal J. K·ellogg, 
we respectfully urge that the decision of the trial court 
should be reversed; and that judgment should be directed 
for entry in favor of plaintiff and appellant herein. The 
premiums were paid for the double indemnity benefits 
in good faith and relied upon by the insured for protec-
tion and benefits to his widow. The insurance company 
is endeavoring to escape payment of this claim by re-
liance upon special, technically worded, ambiguous 
phraseology embodied in the policy. Your Court stated 
m the Handley case, p. 322: 
"It is to be granted that a contract in case 
of ambiguity must be construed against the party 
who rlre"· it and especially is this so in the case 
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of contracts which are sold widely to the average 
man under sales talk which cannot be too technical 
in its expositions and yet which very easily lull 
him into a belief that he has purchased certain 
benefits which upon closer scrutiny of the con-
tract are asserted not to be included . * * * But 
we cannot turn back the clock. This court has 
definitely gone on record as construing the pro-
visions under discussion and eq'Wivalent provi-
sions as reaching cases where the death or dis-
ablement is the unexpected result, intended acts 
making the result itself, rather than the means, 
the accident." (Italics added.) 
Respectfully submitted, 
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
